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Tinubu’s Yoruba agenda risks deep rupture in Kwara, By Farooq Kperogi

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Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

Tinubu’s Yoruba agenda risks deep rupture in Kwara, By Farooq Kperogi

Intra-state cultural and subregional tensions are building up in Kwara State ahead of the 2027 governorship elections because of credible worries that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s all-too-well-known Yoruba nationalist agenda is about to upend the state’s harmony through candidate imposition.

First, some background. Like several states in the country, Kwara is a multi-ethnic and multicultural state. It’s customary to divide it into three distinct geo-cultural zones. There is Kwara Central, which encompasses all of Ilorin and its adjoining areas. It’s linguistically Yoruba but ethnically a mixed bag of people who trace ancestry to Yoruba, Fulani, Kanuri, Baatonu (or Bariba), Hausa, and Nupe ancestors but who are, for all practical purposes, Yoruba. It is a little over 6 percent of the state’s landmass but constitutes 38 percent of the state’s population.

Then there is Kwara South, the most ethnically homogeneous part of the state, which is wholly Yoruba and, in many ways, culturally and linguistically indistinguishable from the Southwest. It is a little over 18 percent of the state’s landmass and 30 percent of its population.

Kwara North is the most ethnically diverse geo-cultural region and is peopled by the Baatonu (or Bariba), Bokobaru, Nupe, and Fulani. It is the non-Yoruba-speaking part of the state that constitutes more than 75 percent of the state’s landmass and 32 percent of its population, although Moro, a small part of Ilorin Emirate, was mysteriously grafted onto Kwara North. Nonetheless, the Nupe, Fulani, Baatonu, and Bokobaru people are culturally closer to the far North than they are to any part of the state.

Since the restoration of civilian rule in 1999, Kwara Central, that is, Ilorin Emirate, has dominated the governorship of the state. By the time of the next governorship election in 2027, Kwara Central would have ruled for 20 out of 28 years.

Kwara South produced the governor for eight years, from 2011 to 2019. Abdulfatah Ahmed, from Ifelodun Local Government, is from Kwara South.

But the entirety of Kwara North has never produced a governor for even a day since 1999, and only for a year and 10 months since 1992.

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Kwara State governor Abdulrahman Abdulrazaq, from all indications, is committed to course correction in 2027 by supporting a rotation of power to Kwara North. A news report I read said he is lending support to Yakubu Danladi Salihu, the Speaker of the Kwara State House of Assembly, who is from Baruten, the second-largest local government in the country, to succeed him. It may not be true, but it has crystallized in public perception.

Senator Sadiq Suleiman Umar, who represents Kwara North in the Senate and who is from Kaiama, is another contender who enjoys widespread support to succeed Abdulrazaq. Both Baruten and Kaiama used to be part of Borgu Local Government before one half of it was ceded to Niger State in the early 1990s.

Yet although consensus, even among prominent players in Ilorin, appears to be coalescing around the idea that the remnant of Borgu in Kwara State, that is, Baruten and Kaiama, should produce the next governor (because the Nupe briefly produced a governor in the aborted Third Republic), it is said that President Tinubu insists that a Yoruba person from Kwara South must be governor.

Widespread whispers indicate that Tinubu’s preference for Abdulrahman’s successor is a certain Bashir Omolaja Bolarinwa, who hails from the same local government as former governor Ahmed and who used to be a local government chairman in Lagos.

A self-described “Yoruba irredentist” who has privileged access to people in Tinubu’s inner circle told me a few days ago that Tinubu wants to use his presidency to advance his sense of a pan-Yoruba agenda and be seen as the reincarnation of Oduduwa.

To that end, he said, Tinubu wants to force the election of “Yoruba” governors in Kwara and Kogi states. Since I didn’t listen in on any conversation where Tinubu said this, I can’t be certain that it’s entirely true, but given what I have described as Tinubu’s studied “Visibilization of Northern Yorubas” in my October 11, 2025, column, it would not surprise me if it were true.

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But it would be a grave error of judgment to railroad Yoruba governors in multi-ethnic states, particularly in Kwara State. First, as I have pointed out, a person from Kwara South has been governor for eight years.

Second, Mohammed Lawal, Kwara’s first governor in the Fourth Republic, although from Ilorin, self-identified as Yoruba and performed many symbolic acts to signal that.

In fact, Governor Abdulrazaq, although a cosmopolitan person who seems to transcend ethnic and religious boundaries, is Yoruba. At least that was what one Sheikh Abdulrahim Aduranigba said seven years ago when he contrasted him with the PDP candidate for the governorship election.

“We have adopted Abdulrazaq as our governorship candidate because he is a Yoruba, and we have instructed him to conduct his campaigns in Yoruba language,” THISDAY quoted him as saying. “The PDP candidate is Fulani, and we challenge him to conduct his campaigns in Fulani language.”

In other words, the Yoruba are not a marginal group in Kwara that need saving by a reincarnated Oduduwa. The people who need “saving” are the non-Yoruba-speaking people of the state who have never produced a governor.

Third, the pushback that the imposition of a governor on account of his ethnic identity would invite could plunge the state into crisis. Ilorin people will resist it. People in Kwara North will resist it, and it will cause needless friction with the south of the state.

Interestingly, Tinubu’s second most prominent traditional title after “Asiwaju” is “Jagaban Borgu.” Kwara’s Kaiama and Baruten local governments, which have never produced a governor for the state since its founding in 1967, are one half of Borgu. It would be ironic if the champion of Borgu (that’s what Jagaban Borgu means) champions the political exclusion of the people he is symbolically supposed to lead and protect.

Tinubu himself is president because of a deliberate policy of positive political discrimination called power rotation, and he is anchoring his reelection on the basis that the South must complete its eight years, like the North before it.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, political representation at the highest levels is more symbolism than substance. Although the nature of ethnocratic governance we call democracy ensures that people in positions of power give preferential treatment to their kind and places of origin, for the most part, all politicians are the same. They first take care of themselves, their families, friends, and associates before the crumbs spread to their “people.”

Yet political representation is the symbolic conduit through which people vicariously connect with governments. When people of Ayetoro Gbede demonstrated the other day, telling Nigerians to leave their “son” Joash Amupitan alone, even though his past tweets question his neutrality and therefore his suitability as INEC chairman, I understood where they were coming from. He is the symbolic conduit through which they connect to the government. Ours is an ethnocracy, not a democracy.

That’s why it’s my long-term belief that the surest way to sustain the form of government we practice now is to deepen and constitutionalize representational equity. No ethnic group should dominate leadership because it has profound implications for psychic exclusion and the predilection to violence.

Baruten, Kaiama, Patigi, and Edu local governments, the non-Yoruba-speaking local governments in the state, are some of the least developed and most backward places in Nigeria. The first roads were tarred in Baruten only a little over a decade ago, and they are already death traps. Most towns are not connected to the national grid, and healthcare is among the worst.

A governor from the area will be compelled by ethnocratic pressures to attend to the most egregious infrastructural deficits that previous governments overlooked.

Let me end with a full disclosure: I am from Baruten Local Government of Kwara State and therefore from “Kwara North.” But my concerns are located in my broader concerns about representational justice, about which I have written in regard to other parts of the country.

Kperogi is a renowned columnist and United States-based Professor of Journalism

Tinubu’s Yoruba agenda risks deep rupture in Kwara, By Farooq Kperogi

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Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

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Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi
Farooq Kperogi

Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

Because human beings are prone to perceive nonexistent patterns, connections and intentional design even in random or unrelated events, a cognitive tendency called apophenia, and because Nigerians have an enduring and justified mistrust of government, I have seen many people question whether the abduction and rescue of pupils and teachers from three schools in the Yawota and Ahoro-Esinele communities of Oriire Local Government Area in Oyo State really happened.

The mistrust is legitimate, but I find the apophenic leap from mistrust to the conclusion that the entire episode was staged a little unsettling.

I am convinced by the available evidence that pupils and teachers were indeed abducted by despicably homicidal terrorists. I have seen no credible evidence that any government paid criminals to stage the spectacle of an abduction and rescue.

Contemporary reporting documented the May 15 attacks, identified abducted children and teachers, interviewed their relatives and recorded the killing of two teachers before the surviving captives regained their freedom.

Terrorist groups have been abducting and killing innocent students for more than a decade and have never needed prompting from politicians to do so. Attributing their heinous crimes to sponsorship by rival factions within the Nigerian political class unintentionally exculpates these scoundrels and converts murderers into mere instruments of political intrigue.

That said, there is no complete clarity about how the pupils and teachers regained their freedom. Government critics have alleged, without evidence, that a huge ransom was paid as a precondition for their release. As I will show later, I doubt this.

But the government’s version of how the pupils and teachers were rescued is not entirely coherent, either.

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The Presidency initially described the rescue as the outcome of a successful joint military, police and intelligence operation. It said eight suspected kidnappers were arrested, other members of the group were killed and neither ransom nor a prisoner exchange was involved. The abductors had allegedly demanded the release of a detained terrorist leader, but the government said he remained in custody and was being prosecuted.

The Army’s subsequent account was less dramatic than the Presidency’s early language suggested. It did not say troops stormed the camp and physically extracted the hostages during a firefight. Instead, it said a month-long intelligence operation identified the group’s leaders, informants, logistical networks and hideouts. According to the Army, arrests disrupted the group and exerted pressure that “ultimately led the terrorist group to unconditionally release the pupils and teachers.”

In a July 10 interview with Tinubu-owned TVC News, former DSS operative Seyi Adetayo offered a more specific but as yet uncorroborated explanation of the operational modalities of the rescue. He claimed that government security operatives identified and detained some kidnappers’ mothers, wives, children and other associates, sent recordings of those arrests to the abductors and combined coercive pressure with intelligence operations. He also claimed that the terrorists were warned that harm to their captives would bring harm to their relatives.

Based on the available evidence, the most defensible interpretation of what happened is that this was an unusually collaborative, intelligence-driven and coercively negotiated release. It was probably not a conventional battlefield rescue. Nor does it appear to have been a ransom-propelled release.

This actually fills me with hope. It means the government may have found a potentially effective template for disrupting terrorist networks and rescuing their victims without exposing abductees to the indiscriminate violence of a frontal military assault.

But the part of the template worth replicating is its lawful core: interagency cooperation, careful intelligence gathering, the identification of terrorist networks, the disruption of their supply routes and the arrest of culpable collaborators.

There would be no greater evidence for the truth of the government’s account of the Oriire rescue than the successful replication of its methods in unresolved mass-abduction cases nationwide.

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The February 3-4 terrorist assault on Woro and neighboring Nuku communities in Kaiama Local Government Area of Kwara State not only killed scores of people but also led to a mass abduction. UNICEF reported that around 176 women, including pregnant women, and children were kidnapped from Woro.

More than five months later, the victims have not been released, according to the latest public reports. The terrorists have released videos showing women and small children appealing desperately for intervention. They, too, need the collaborative intelligence-gathering energies that security agencies deployed in Oyo.

On May 15, suspected militants abducted 42 children from Mussa Primary and Junior Secondary School and surrounding homes in Askira-Uba Local Government Area of Borno State. Some of the abductees were extremely young. According to the latest available reporting, all 42 remain missing.

There was a separate school attack in Lassa town in the same local government area in Borno on June 29. Gunmen attacked Government Day Secondary School while students were taking examinations. Eight people were rescued, but 36 students and one staff member remain captive. The students comprised 25 girls and 11 boys.

On June 7, in Magamin Diddi village in Maradun Local Government Area of Zamfara State, bandits reportedly invited villagers to what was presented as a peace meeting and then abducted them. The police confirmed that 39 people were taken, although community estimates were as high as 50. The kidnappers reportedly demanded ₦125 million and released some captives to communicate the demand. There has been no authoritative public account of the remaining captives’ release.

Nor should the passage of time cause older victims to disappear from the national conscience. Eighty-nine of the Chibok schoolgirls abducted in 2014 remain officially unaccounted for. Their families have endured more than a decade of promises, occasional discoveries and prolonged uncertainty.

There are many more cases than I have the space to chronicle in this column. Security forces presumably have records of mass abductions, including many that never made the national news. Yet Nigeria has developed a disturbing ritual in which outrage follows an abduction, officials promise decisive action and public attention eventually moves elsewhere while families remain imprisoned in terrifyingly crippling uncertainty.

The true test of the Oyo operation is not the applause it generated after one dramatic success but the number of forgotten captives its methods can bring home. If its intelligence model worked as the government says it did, it should become a national operational doctrine rather than a self-contained public-relations trophy.

Replicating it in Woro, Mussa, Lassa, Magamin Diddi and other communities would simultaneously rescue imperiled citizens, restore public faith in the capacity of the government to perform its primary duty and begin to extirpate a kidnapping economy that has destroyed communal peace and individual peace of mind across Nigeria. Until that happens, Oyo remains an encouraging breakthrough, but not yet a proven national template.

 

 

Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

Kperogi is a renowned columnist and United States-based professor of journalism 

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Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

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Azu Ishiekwene
Azu Ishiekwene

Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

•Ishiekwene is the Editor-In-Chief of LEADERSHIP and author of the book, Writing for Media and Monetising It. 

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STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

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BREAKING: Kidnapped Oyo Pupils, Teachers Regain Freedom After 55 Days + VIDEO

STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

THE OGBOMOSO RESCUE: CELEBRATE THE VICTORY, PRESERVE THE LESSONS

By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu Rtd

Amplified by the Good Governance Group (GGG)

ABUJA – The safe recovery of the remaining pupils and teachers abducted from schools in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State has been met with nationwide relief and celebration. After 56 days in captivity, the children and teachers have been reunited with their families, marking the conclusion of a tense hostage crisis that gripped the nation.

According to the Presidency, the victims were recovered through a sustained military, police and intelligence-driven operation. Eight suspected kidnappers have been arrested and placed in DSS custody, while some members of the group were reportedly neutralised. The Presidency has also stated that no ransom was paid and no prisoner exchange took place, with the terrorist kingpin demanded by the abductors remaining in custody and facing prosecution.

OPERATIONAL SUCCESS OR PROFESSIONAL RESTRAINT?

Security expert Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu Rtd has offered a comprehensive analysis of the operation, emphasising the professional dilemmas inherent in hostage rescue missions.

“Knowing where hostages are located is not the same as possessing a safe opportunity to rescue them,” Shehu stated. “Before action can be taken, commanders must understand the disposition of the captors, the exact location and condition of the hostages, the terrain, and whether an assault is likely to trigger the execution of the hostages.”

The retired officer stressed that hostage rescue operations frequently involve prolonged surveillance, human intelligence, communications interception, and meticulous preparation before force is finally employed.

“The objective is not merely to reach the kidnappers. The objective is to recover the hostages alive,” he added.

INTELLIGENCE: THE DECISIVE WEAPON

Perhaps the most significant feature of the operation, according to Shehu, is the apparent success of intelligence gathering.

“Popular imagination often credits hostage rescues to the soldiers seen during the final assault. Professional practitioners know differently. The visible rescue is merely the final phase. The decisive work usually begins much earlier,” he explained.

Shehu noted that intelligence officers identify patterns, communities provide information, technical surveillance tracks movement, and communications are analysed before any tactical commander can intervene with an acceptable level of risk.

“Firepower may conclude an operation. Intelligence makes it possible,” he said.

INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

The reported cooperation among the Armed Forces, the DSS and the Nigeria Police Force has also been highlighted as a critical success factor.

“No single institution possesses every capability required to resolve a complex hostage crisis,” Shehu noted, pointing out that Nigeria lacks a dedicated Hostage Rescue Unit comparable to France’s GIGN.

“The Armed Forces contribute operational reach, tactical capability and specialised combat assets. The Police contribute investigative powers, local policing structures and criminal justice responsibilities. The DSS contributes specialised intelligence capabilities. Each institution performs a distinct but complementary function,” he explained.

THE HUMAN COST

Despite the successful rescue, Shehu emphasised that the incident was not casualty-free.

“From official snippets, a couple of security personnel were lost. Lives were lost during the initial attack. Most painfully, Mr. Oyedokun, one of the abducted teachers, was murdered while in captivity. His death reminds us that this was never simply a kidnapping. It was a brutal act of terrorism against innocent civilians,” he stated.

“Our celebration must therefore be accompanied by remembrance. Our relief must be accompanied by compassion.”

SAFE SCHOOLS: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE

Perhaps the most critical lesson emerging from the Ogbomoso incident, according to Shehu, is the urgent need to strengthen Nigeria’s Safe Schools Programme.

“The 3 affected schools—Community Grammar School, Baptist Nursery and Primary School, and L.A. Primary School in Oriire Local Government Area—like most schools in Nigeria, were in every practical sense UNSAFE SCHOOLS right from the beginning,” he asserted.

Shehu argued that the ultimate objective of security policy is not to rescue children after they have been abducted but to prevent schools from becoming targets in the first place.

“A nation that continually celebrates successful hostage rescues without making its schools safer has addressed the symptom while leaving the underlying vulnerability intact,” he warned.

A CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW

The security expert has called for a thorough after-action review of the Ogbomoso incident, examining intelligence indicators, emergency response procedures, and security architecture around vulnerable schools.

“These questions are not criticisms. They are the foundation of professional improvement. Security institutions that refuse to learn eventually repeat their mistakes. Those that institutionalise learning become progressively stronger,” Shehu stated.

PSYCHOSOCIAL RECOVERY

Shehu also emphasised that the Government’s responsibilities continue beyond the rescue operation.

“The rescued pupils and teachers are survivors of a traumatic experience. They now require protection of a different kind: medical examinations, psychological first aid, trauma-informed counselling, family reunification, educational reintegration, and long-term psychosocial support,” he said.

“Children emerging from prolonged captivity should never become media spectacles.”

THE ENDURING VICTORY

“Recovering the remaining children and teachers was the immediate victory. Making every Nigerian school a genuinely safe school will be the enduring victory,” Shehu concluded.

“That is the lesson we must preserve.”

 

 

STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

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