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Why Yahaya Bello does not represent the youth – Farooq Kperogi

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Yahaya Bello

Why Yahaya Bello does not represent the youth – Farooq Kperogi

A persistent but entirely illogical and factually inaccurate response to my column on former Kogi State governor Yahaya Bello revolves around the notion that his terrible record as a governor somehow delegitimizes youth participation in government and undermines the “Not Too Young to Run” bill.

First of all, Yahaya Bello became a governor at 41 in 2016. There’s no country in the world where 41 is regarded as “youth.” He is a full-grown adult.

The UN defines youth as people between the ages of 15 and 24. In the United States, it’s between 15 and 24 years. In the European Union and the United Kingdom, it encompasses individuals aged 15 to 25.

The Commonwealth limits it to the ages of 15 through 29. But the African Youth Charter, which has perhaps the most elastic definitional compass of youth in the world, defines it as “any individual between 15-35 years of age.”

The Nigerian National Youth Policy obviously derives inspirational strength for its conception of youth from the African Youth Charter because it also officially refers to people between the ages of 18 and 35 as belonging to the “youth.”

This is all a giant irony, of course. Nigeria, which has an average life expectancy of 55 years, regards 35 years as “youth” (which means, on average, Nigerians spend only 20 years as “adults”) while industrialized societies with higher average life expectancies (it’s 77 for the United States and 81 for the European Union) have a lower age threshold for youth.

It’s even worse in the general Nigerian population, which regards a 48-year-old man (who has already lived more than half of his life) as a “youth” and uses his indiscretions, ineptitude, infantilism, and larceny as justifications to shut out young people from governance.

Yahaha Bello didn’t need the “Not Too Young to Run” legislation to be a governor. The minimum age required to be a governor in the 1999 constitution—before the “Not Too Young to Run” bill was signed into law on May 31, 2018—was and still is 35. The bill did not change the age requirement for governorship positions.

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That was why we had many people who were elected governors in their 30s in 1999. For example, Ibrahim Saminu Turaki was elected governor of Jigawa State at the age of 36. Donald Duke was 38 years old when he was elected governor of Cross River State in 1999. Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia was 39. Ahmad Sani Yerima of Zamfara was 39. Enugu State’s Chimaroke Nnamani was 39.

With a few exceptions, the rest of the governors in 1999 were in their 40s (Delta State’s James Ibori was exactly 40), which is consistent with Yahaya Bello’s age. Why didn’t critics of youth participation in government invoke the failures of much younger governors than Bello at the incipience of the Fourth Republic to delegitimize “youth” participation in government?

The obsession with the youth of people in government in Nigeria is particularly strange because we have had Yakubu Gowon, a then 31-year-old unmarried man, as Head of State. Olusegun Obasanjo was 38 when he first became the head of state. Muhammadu Buhari and Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi were 41. IBB was 44.

In fact, most of the early leaders we venerate today were elected/appointed into their positions when they were in the same age group as Yahaya Bello. For example, Sir Ahmadu Bello assumed office as the Premier of the Northern Region on October 1, 1954, at the age of 44.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo became the Premier of the Western Region in 1952 at the age of 44. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was 47/48 when he became the Prime Minister of Nigeria in 1960. Murtala Muhammed was only 36 when he became the Head of State of Nigeria on July 29, 1975.

The examples are legion, but the point is that there is nothing unusual about someone of Yahaya Bello’s age being a governor. That’s why I find the focus on his age both ignorant and ahistorical.

Of course, more than anything, all that this points to is that people who got into government in their 30s and 40s two or three decades ago are still in power or hanging around the corridors of power, which leaves only a little space for new entrants from that age bracket.

So, the few people in their 30s and 40s who make it to the circles of political power in contemporary Nigeria come across as novel, as marvels of young people in government, and as generational curiosities whose missteps are exteriorized to all people within their age range who are outside the orbit of power and who might want to get into it.

That’s unfair. Just like the incompetence, callousness, and venality of older politicians shouldn’t be used against all older people, Yahaya Bello’s villainy and corruption should not be used against people in his age bracket— or younger.

This attitude implies that had Yahaya Bello been a geriatric fuddy-duddy, and not a 48-year-old man, he would not have been the debauched, profligate thug that he is, which is absolute flapdoodle.

Age has no effect on integrity and probity. It is defeatist and evinces low self-worth for young people to beat themselves up because a 48-year-old man who became a governor at 41 turned out to be a rotten, incurable crook who pillaged his state without the slightest tinge of compunction and then installed a slavish, empty-headed puppet as his successor.

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It’s mostly young people—in the peculiar way Nigerians understand young people—who are saying Yahaya Bello’s spectacular incompetence and depravity symbolize the failure of “youth” in governance and that the older generation is justified in its reluctance to share power with young people.

In other words, if a few “youths” in government mess up, all youth should take the blame for it, accept that the failure of one of them is the failure of all of them, and then step back for the older order to continue to misrule exclusively.

Notice that no one, certainly no older person I know of, says older people shouldn’t be allowed to govern because they’ve been messing up all these years. Only the “youth” are delegitimized on account of their age when they mess up. That is reverse ageism, that is, the idea that only old age, not youth or knowledge, should confer authority or respect on people.

We are more than our ages. We embody a totality of multiple influences. The fact that Yahaya Bello was a grasping, primitive bandit in government doesn’t mean every 41-year-old who becomes a governor will be like him. That’s ridiculously reductionist.

In any case, youth or old age are not permanent states. They are in perpetual flux. It is yesterday’s youth that become today’s older people.

Nigeria is one of the world’s youngest countries with a median age of 16. Yet, when we look at the corridors of power, the vibrancy of youth is conspicuously absent. This gap between our young population and their representation in governance is not just a gap in numbers, but a gap in fresh ideas, innovation, and the spirit of our nation.

Yahaya Bello did not fail because he was young. He failed because he never prepared to succeed, and that wasn’t a function of his “youth.” Donald Duke was the second youngest governor in 1999, and he is credited with making tremendous marks in governing Cross River State.

Yes, age and experience have their place. But so does youth. An Igbo proverb, after all, says “If a child washes his hands, he could eat with Kings.”

Farooq Kperogi is a renowned Nigerian newspaper columnist and United States-based professor of journalism 

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Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

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Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi
Farooq Kperogi

Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

Because human beings are prone to perceive nonexistent patterns, connections and intentional design even in random or unrelated events, a cognitive tendency called apophenia, and because Nigerians have an enduring and justified mistrust of government, I have seen many people question whether the abduction and rescue of pupils and teachers from three schools in the Yawota and Ahoro-Esinele communities of Oriire Local Government Area in Oyo State really happened.

The mistrust is legitimate, but I find the apophenic leap from mistrust to the conclusion that the entire episode was staged a little unsettling.

I am convinced by the available evidence that pupils and teachers were indeed abducted by despicably homicidal terrorists. I have seen no credible evidence that any government paid criminals to stage the spectacle of an abduction and rescue.

Contemporary reporting documented the May 15 attacks, identified abducted children and teachers, interviewed their relatives and recorded the killing of two teachers before the surviving captives regained their freedom.

Terrorist groups have been abducting and killing innocent students for more than a decade and have never needed prompting from politicians to do so. Attributing their heinous crimes to sponsorship by rival factions within the Nigerian political class unintentionally exculpates these scoundrels and converts murderers into mere instruments of political intrigue.

That said, there is no complete clarity about how the pupils and teachers regained their freedom. Government critics have alleged, without evidence, that a huge ransom was paid as a precondition for their release. As I will show later, I doubt this.

But the government’s version of how the pupils and teachers were rescued is not entirely coherent, either.

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The Presidency initially described the rescue as the outcome of a successful joint military, police and intelligence operation. It said eight suspected kidnappers were arrested, other members of the group were killed and neither ransom nor a prisoner exchange was involved. The abductors had allegedly demanded the release of a detained terrorist leader, but the government said he remained in custody and was being prosecuted.

The Army’s subsequent account was less dramatic than the Presidency’s early language suggested. It did not say troops stormed the camp and physically extracted the hostages during a firefight. Instead, it said a month-long intelligence operation identified the group’s leaders, informants, logistical networks and hideouts. According to the Army, arrests disrupted the group and exerted pressure that “ultimately led the terrorist group to unconditionally release the pupils and teachers.”

In a July 10 interview with Tinubu-owned TVC News, former DSS operative Seyi Adetayo offered a more specific but as yet uncorroborated explanation of the operational modalities of the rescue. He claimed that government security operatives identified and detained some kidnappers’ mothers, wives, children and other associates, sent recordings of those arrests to the abductors and combined coercive pressure with intelligence operations. He also claimed that the terrorists were warned that harm to their captives would bring harm to their relatives.

Based on the available evidence, the most defensible interpretation of what happened is that this was an unusually collaborative, intelligence-driven and coercively negotiated release. It was probably not a conventional battlefield rescue. Nor does it appear to have been a ransom-propelled release.

This actually fills me with hope. It means the government may have found a potentially effective template for disrupting terrorist networks and rescuing their victims without exposing abductees to the indiscriminate violence of a frontal military assault.

But the part of the template worth replicating is its lawful core: interagency cooperation, careful intelligence gathering, the identification of terrorist networks, the disruption of their supply routes and the arrest of culpable collaborators.

There would be no greater evidence for the truth of the government’s account of the Oriire rescue than the successful replication of its methods in unresolved mass-abduction cases nationwide.

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The February 3-4 terrorist assault on Woro and neighboring Nuku communities in Kaiama Local Government Area of Kwara State not only killed scores of people but also led to a mass abduction. UNICEF reported that around 176 women, including pregnant women, and children were kidnapped from Woro.

More than five months later, the victims have not been released, according to the latest public reports. The terrorists have released videos showing women and small children appealing desperately for intervention. They, too, need the collaborative intelligence-gathering energies that security agencies deployed in Oyo.

On May 15, suspected militants abducted 42 children from Mussa Primary and Junior Secondary School and surrounding homes in Askira-Uba Local Government Area of Borno State. Some of the abductees were extremely young. According to the latest available reporting, all 42 remain missing.

There was a separate school attack in Lassa town in the same local government area in Borno on June 29. Gunmen attacked Government Day Secondary School while students were taking examinations. Eight people were rescued, but 36 students and one staff member remain captive. The students comprised 25 girls and 11 boys.

On June 7, in Magamin Diddi village in Maradun Local Government Area of Zamfara State, bandits reportedly invited villagers to what was presented as a peace meeting and then abducted them. The police confirmed that 39 people were taken, although community estimates were as high as 50. The kidnappers reportedly demanded ₦125 million and released some captives to communicate the demand. There has been no authoritative public account of the remaining captives’ release.

Nor should the passage of time cause older victims to disappear from the national conscience. Eighty-nine of the Chibok schoolgirls abducted in 2014 remain officially unaccounted for. Their families have endured more than a decade of promises, occasional discoveries and prolonged uncertainty.

There are many more cases than I have the space to chronicle in this column. Security forces presumably have records of mass abductions, including many that never made the national news. Yet Nigeria has developed a disturbing ritual in which outrage follows an abduction, officials promise decisive action and public attention eventually moves elsewhere while families remain imprisoned in terrifyingly crippling uncertainty.

The true test of the Oyo operation is not the applause it generated after one dramatic success but the number of forgotten captives its methods can bring home. If its intelligence model worked as the government says it did, it should become a national operational doctrine rather than a self-contained public-relations trophy.

Replicating it in Woro, Mussa, Lassa, Magamin Diddi and other communities would simultaneously rescue imperiled citizens, restore public faith in the capacity of the government to perform its primary duty and begin to extirpate a kidnapping economy that has destroyed communal peace and individual peace of mind across Nigeria. Until that happens, Oyo remains an encouraging breakthrough, but not yet a proven national template.

 

 

Case for replicating the Oyo kidnap-rescue template nationwide, By Farooq Kperogi

Kperogi is a renowned columnist and United States-based professor of journalism 

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Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

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Azu Ishiekwene
Azu Ishiekwene

Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

Shettima’s final test, by Azu Ishiekwene

•Ishiekwene is the Editor-In-Chief of LEADERSHIP and author of the book, Writing for Media and Monetising It. 

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STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

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BREAKING: Kidnapped Oyo Pupils, Teachers Regain Freedom After 55 Days + VIDEO

STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

THE OGBOMOSO RESCUE: CELEBRATE THE VICTORY, PRESERVE THE LESSONS

By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu Rtd

Amplified by the Good Governance Group (GGG)

ABUJA – The safe recovery of the remaining pupils and teachers abducted from schools in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State has been met with nationwide relief and celebration. After 56 days in captivity, the children and teachers have been reunited with their families, marking the conclusion of a tense hostage crisis that gripped the nation.

According to the Presidency, the victims were recovered through a sustained military, police and intelligence-driven operation. Eight suspected kidnappers have been arrested and placed in DSS custody, while some members of the group were reportedly neutralised. The Presidency has also stated that no ransom was paid and no prisoner exchange took place, with the terrorist kingpin demanded by the abductors remaining in custody and facing prosecution.

OPERATIONAL SUCCESS OR PROFESSIONAL RESTRAINT?

Security expert Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu Rtd has offered a comprehensive analysis of the operation, emphasising the professional dilemmas inherent in hostage rescue missions.

“Knowing where hostages are located is not the same as possessing a safe opportunity to rescue them,” Shehu stated. “Before action can be taken, commanders must understand the disposition of the captors, the exact location and condition of the hostages, the terrain, and whether an assault is likely to trigger the execution of the hostages.”

The retired officer stressed that hostage rescue operations frequently involve prolonged surveillance, human intelligence, communications interception, and meticulous preparation before force is finally employed.

“The objective is not merely to reach the kidnappers. The objective is to recover the hostages alive,” he added.

INTELLIGENCE: THE DECISIVE WEAPON

Perhaps the most significant feature of the operation, according to Shehu, is the apparent success of intelligence gathering.

“Popular imagination often credits hostage rescues to the soldiers seen during the final assault. Professional practitioners know differently. The visible rescue is merely the final phase. The decisive work usually begins much earlier,” he explained.

Shehu noted that intelligence officers identify patterns, communities provide information, technical surveillance tracks movement, and communications are analysed before any tactical commander can intervene with an acceptable level of risk.

“Firepower may conclude an operation. Intelligence makes it possible,” he said.

INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

The reported cooperation among the Armed Forces, the DSS and the Nigeria Police Force has also been highlighted as a critical success factor.

“No single institution possesses every capability required to resolve a complex hostage crisis,” Shehu noted, pointing out that Nigeria lacks a dedicated Hostage Rescue Unit comparable to France’s GIGN.

“The Armed Forces contribute operational reach, tactical capability and specialised combat assets. The Police contribute investigative powers, local policing structures and criminal justice responsibilities. The DSS contributes specialised intelligence capabilities. Each institution performs a distinct but complementary function,” he explained.

THE HUMAN COST

Despite the successful rescue, Shehu emphasised that the incident was not casualty-free.

“From official snippets, a couple of security personnel were lost. Lives were lost during the initial attack. Most painfully, Mr. Oyedokun, one of the abducted teachers, was murdered while in captivity. His death reminds us that this was never simply a kidnapping. It was a brutal act of terrorism against innocent civilians,” he stated.

“Our celebration must therefore be accompanied by remembrance. Our relief must be accompanied by compassion.”

SAFE SCHOOLS: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE

Perhaps the most critical lesson emerging from the Ogbomoso incident, according to Shehu, is the urgent need to strengthen Nigeria’s Safe Schools Programme.

“The 3 affected schools—Community Grammar School, Baptist Nursery and Primary School, and L.A. Primary School in Oriire Local Government Area—like most schools in Nigeria, were in every practical sense UNSAFE SCHOOLS right from the beginning,” he asserted.

Shehu argued that the ultimate objective of security policy is not to rescue children after they have been abducted but to prevent schools from becoming targets in the first place.

“A nation that continually celebrates successful hostage rescues without making its schools safer has addressed the symptom while leaving the underlying vulnerability intact,” he warned.

A CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW

The security expert has called for a thorough after-action review of the Ogbomoso incident, examining intelligence indicators, emergency response procedures, and security architecture around vulnerable schools.

“These questions are not criticisms. They are the foundation of professional improvement. Security institutions that refuse to learn eventually repeat their mistakes. Those that institutionalise learning become progressively stronger,” Shehu stated.

PSYCHOSOCIAL RECOVERY

Shehu also emphasised that the Government’s responsibilities continue beyond the rescue operation.

“The rescued pupils and teachers are survivors of a traumatic experience. They now require protection of a different kind: medical examinations, psychological first aid, trauma-informed counselling, family reunification, educational reintegration, and long-term psychosocial support,” he said.

“Children emerging from prolonged captivity should never become media spectacles.”

THE ENDURING VICTORY

“Recovering the remaining children and teachers was the immediate victory. Making every Nigerian school a genuinely safe school will be the enduring victory,” Shehu concluded.

“That is the lesson we must preserve.”

 

 

STATE OF THE NATION: INSECURITY IN NIGERIA AND MATTERS ARISING

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