Opinion
Will the humble pie heal ECOWAS? – Azubuike Ishiekwene
Will the humble pie heal ECOWAS? – Azubuike Ishiekwene
The resolutions following the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), at the recently concluded summit of Heads of State and Government in Abuja, were truly extraordinary.
Seven months after threatening to deploy force in Niger, one of the four delinquent states – the others being Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso – and three months after wide-ranging economic sanctions were imposed on all four, the regional body backed down spectacularly last week.
If the Afrobeat icon, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, had rendered a welcome tune for the embattled regional leaders as they met in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, it would have been his famous “Confusion Break Bone (CBB).” Misery never had a better company than the current state of affairs in the 50-year-old regional body, which apart from SADC, was perhaps Africa’s most exemplary model of regional co-operation.
While ECOWAS said it offered amnesty to its delinquent members on “humanitarian grounds”, the response from the military leaders in Bamako, Conakry, Ouagadougou and Niamey, has been mockingly indifferent. Yet the truth about how this 15-member regional block with annual trade valued at $150 billion came to this sorry pass is deeper and more nuanced than it appears.
Wrong turn
The Lomé Declaration of July 2000 recognised the continent was drifting and needed urgent course correction. An earlier era of democratic consolidation was being eroded by the return of military coups and the AU needed to create mechanisms to roll back the trend.
But that’s precisely where the problem was misdiagnosed. While continental leaders were rightly concerned that unconstitutional changes of government were once again becoming a clear and present danger, the emphasis has been big on response but often, too little too late, on prevention.
Nowhere has the situation played out more regrettably than in the delinquent Sahelian states of Mali, Guinea Burkina Faso and Niger. Whereas ECOWAS played a lead role in managing the crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and forced Yahaya Jammeh to back down when he tried to play games in The Gambia after his final term, the problems in Francophone west Africa are more complicated. They speak French, which translated, means the continent should have prioritised prevention, instead of response.
The French question
The delinquent military leaders have accused ECOWAS of keeping silent while their countries have been ripped off by France for decades. This largely true, but partly self-serving sentiment has found a place in the hearts and minds of citizens in these countries.
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France has accumulated a notoriously poor record on the continent that it can hardly be proud of. In Niger, for example, Tom Burgis writes in his book, The Looting Machine, that French state-owned atomic energy group Areva’s profit from uranium is twice Niger’s GDP. The footprint is the same everywhere in the region.
Fourteen Francophone countries, including the four troubled ones, store 50 percent of their reserves in the French Treasury, an arrangement which has been widely criticised. Even French President Emmanuel Macron, born after colonial rule, acknowledged this injustice with a heavy heart, but then turned around to say later it was a part of the “civilising” obligations of France. If civilisation means robbing a country at gunpoint and having the victims pay interest for the crime, I wonder what primitiveness would look like.
While France may be the most obvious, and perhaps the most perniciously complicit, it is not the only source of Francophone west Africa’s misery. As I wrote in an earlier article on this subject entitled, “Again, A Bizarre Joke in Niger Speaks French,” China, and lately, Russia, also have their hands in it for their own strategic interests. Yet, not a single one of these foreign powers have gotten away with murder without the complicity of the political elite in these countries – politicians and military alike.
It is convenient for the delinquent military leaders in the Sahelian states to look for scapegoats elsewhere, exploiting widespread insecurity, rampant poverty, identity politics and foreign meddling to gain legitimacy.
The point is, military leaders have no greater claim to patriotism than do the rest of us. We have seen in dozens of military coups on the continent that those who came claiming to be messiahs left their countries worse off.
Blaming Tinubu?
Where does the flip-flop and mollycoddling leave ECOWAS, a regional body obviously anxious to prove under the leadership of Nigeria’s President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, that it is as good as its word that coups would have no place on his watch?
It’s hard to blame Tinubu for pressing ECOWAS to act tough as military coups piled on themselves. As the leader of a country that had witnessed nearly half a dozen successful coups, he had to do what he did as a matter of self-preservation and enlightened interest.
The problem, however, was that there were so many artisans involved in making this broth, it turned out to be a chef’s nightmare. Strategy should never have been sacrificed for expediency.
The Delinquent Four have seen that the regional powerhouses have been considerably weakened and distracted internally by insurgency, political strife, economic crisis, and poor governance. Add that to a global system pre-occupied with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, then it becomes clearer why the Delinquent Four have adopted defiance as strategy.
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The Chairman of the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Toure, expressed the hope that eating the humble pie is worth the price of losing four members. I’m not sure the Delinquent Four will withdraw their threat of leaving, U-turn or not. They’ve got ECOWAS exactly where they wanted and won’t be in a hurry to climb down. Sanctions hurt and studies have shown that they could have statistically significant immediate and long-term effects on the targets.
But that, of course, is assuming that the countries imposing sanctions have the capacity and will to enforce them. Even though the four countries targeted by ECOWAS are landlocked and therefore could ordinarily have felt the impact more, boundaries in the subregion are so porous and informal trade so deeply entrenched – about 30 percent of regional trade actually – a successful implementation of economic sanctions was always going to be quite problematic.
Then, there is the potential threat that if these countries harden beyond redemption, it would not only further weaken the multinational framework for containing insurgency in the region, these states may themselves become epicentres of regional destablisation.
As things are, ECOWAS will have to swallow its pride and set up credible negotiating teams with the Delinquent Four that take into account their grievances. The artisans have done enough harm. It’s unlikely that these military leaders would honour any transition guidelines but that must remain the minimum basis for any future agreements.
Tacky Macky Sall
There is, of course, the case of Senegal where President Macky Sall is also waiting to go rogue. Before ECOWAS is caught on the backfoot again, this would be a good time to start meaningful negotiations to ensure that Sall doesn’t endanger himself, his country and the subregion by extending his tenure too far beyond his already exhausted expiry date.
In light of the fragile situation in the continent, the AU must now pay far greater attention to prevention, focusing on triggers and early warning signs such as flawed elections, poor governance, and systemic corruption, instead of making a virtue of chasing the horses after they have bolted the stable.
That’s why the launch this week of the Regional Citizen’s Dialogue Programme (RCDP) in Abuja by a consortium of NIPSS, Kuru; the Dantiye Centre, Kano; the Sierra Leone-based regional centre (RCGSPI); and KAICIID, to mobilise civil society and complement institutional effort at prioritising prevention deserves serious attention.
Who would have thought that three landlocked countries with a combined eight percent contribution to the $761billion GDP of ECOWAS, according to the World Bank, could hold the community to ransom, forcing it to swallow more than a trayful of humble pie?
…Azubuike Ishiekwene is the Senior Vice Chairman and Editor-In-Chief of LEADERSHIP Newspaper Group.
Will the humble pie heal ECOWAS? – Azubuike Ishiekwene
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Opinion
Understanding Ahmad Gumi Controversy and Nigeria’s Security Power Structure
Understanding Ahmad Gumi Controversy and Nigeria’s Security Power Structure
By Mudashir “Dipo” Teniola
The conversation did not begin with Sheikh Ahmad Gumi. Like many discussions about Nigeria’s worsening insecurity, it started with another painful story — the abduction and killing of a schoolteacher in Oyo State. Frustration filled the room like thick harmattan dust before someone shifted the mood with a pointed remark:
“But this Gumi sef, despite everything, he’s still moving freely.”
That single sentence captured a deeper national confusion: how can a cleric repeatedly associated in public discourse with dialogues involving bandits, kidnappers, and armed groups continue to operate openly while the government’s response appears cautious and restrained?
To ask that question is not necessarily to defend or condemn Ahmad Gumi. Rather, it is to move beyond headlines and confront the complicated realities of Nigeria’s power structure — a system shaped by history, institutional relationships, religion, military culture, and elite influence.
Why Public Outrage Feels Understandable
Many Nigerians, especially in Southern Nigeria and among Northern Christian communities, react strongly to Gumi because their anger is rooted in lived trauma.
They remember the violence that plagued the Kaduna–Birnin Gwari corridor, the March 2022 Abuja–Kaduna train attack that left passengers kidnapped for months, and the repeated mass abductions in Zamfara and other northern states that normalised ransom negotiations and deepened public fear.
During some of the country’s darkest moments, Gumi’s visits to forest camps, his advocacy for negotiation alongside military action, and comments interpreted by critics as sympathetic to bandits generated widespread backlash.
For victims and their families, complex political analysis often matters less than justice and safety. Their frustration is therefore legitimate. When many Nigerians ask, “Why is this man still free?” they are expressing accumulated national pain and distrust in state institutions.
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Still, public anger alone does not fully explain the situation.
Who Ahmad Gumi Is Beyond the Headlines
Public conversations often reduce Gumi to a “controversial cleric,” but his background is far more layered.
He is:
- Son of the late Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, one of Northern Nigeria’s most influential Islamic scholars with longstanding ties to the old Ahmadu Bello political establishment.
- A trained medical doctor who served in the Nigerian Army Medical Corps and retired with the rank of captain.
- An Islamic scholar who furthered his religious studies in Saudi Arabia.
The military aspect of his identity is particularly important in understanding his influence.
In Nigeria, military affiliation often extends beyond active service. Retired officers frequently maintain strong institutional relationships, networks, and influence long after leaving the armed forces. This does not automatically provide immunity, but it can shape how the state approaches sensitive figures connected to security-related matters.
For many within government and security circles, Gumi is not viewed solely as a cleric. He represents a combination of religious authority, elite northern pedigree, and military familiarity — factors that complicate any simplistic interpretation of his role in Nigeria’s security discourse.
Nigeria’s Long History of Negotiating With Armed Groups
Another uncomfortable reality is that Nigeria’s security strategy has rarely relied on military force alone.
Successive governments have, at different times, adopted negotiation or reintegration strategies with violent non-state actors. Examples include:
- The Niger Delta Amnesty Programme introduced under late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.
- Reported backchannel discussions with factions linked to Boko Haram.
- Quiet engagement efforts by some northern governors seeking dialogue with armed bandit groups before publicly distancing themselves from such approaches.
Gumi has also claimed in previous interviews that elements within the Nigerian state were aware of, or indirectly involved in, some of his engagements with armed groups.
Whether Nigerians agree with that approach or not, these realities place him within a broader historical pattern of state inconsistency in handling insecurity.
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That inconsistency partly explains why many citizens struggle to understand why he has not faced harsher official consequences.
Why Many Nigerians Perceive Double Standards
For many observers in Southern Nigeria, comparisons are often drawn between Gumi and separatist figures such as Nnamdi Kanu or Sunday Igboho.
To such critics, the difference in state response reinforces perceptions of ethnic or religious bias within Nigeria’s power structure.
However, reducing the matter solely to religion or ethnicity oversimplifies a more complex system.
In Northern Nigeria, religious authority, military influence, bureaucracy, and political elite networks have historically overlapped in ways that differ from the more fragmented power structures in many southern states.
As a result, when Gumi speaks, some Nigerians hear not just an Islamic cleric but echoes of a broader establishment network with historical institutional influence.
At the same time, dismissing all criticism against him as Islamophobia or anti-Fulani sentiment is equally dishonest. Many citizens genuinely fear that rhetoric perceived as accommodating bandit grievances may unintentionally normalise criminality or deepen the suffering of victims.
The Bigger Lesson for Nigeria
The “Ahmad Gumi phenomenon” is not about mystery or untouchability. It reflects the layered realities of power in Nigeria.
In the country’s political and security landscape, influence is rarely straightforward. Military history, religious authority, elite networks, ethnicity, and institutional memory often intersect in ways outsiders may not immediately understand.
Recognising this complexity does not excuse insecurity, nor does it erase the pain of victims. But it helps explain why figures like Gumi occupy controversial yet enduring spaces within national conversations.
The killing of innocent Nigerians — from abducted teachers to victims of mass kidnappings — demands a more effective security strategy, stronger governance, and reduced tolerance for criminal economies built around ransom and violence.
Nigeria cannot move forward if outrage replaces analysis or if difficult national questions are reduced to simplistic talking points.
Understanding the structures that shape influence in the country is uncomfortable, but necessary. Nigeria is a deeply layered society, and navigating it requires the ability to hold multiple truths at once: anger over violence, awareness of institutional realities, and a commitment to justice without fear or favour.
Only then can the country move beyond endless outrage toward meaningful understanding and lasting solutions.
Understanding Ahmad Gumi Controversy and Nigeria’s Security Power Structure
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Opinion
War against Nigeria’s academic title fraud, By Farooq Kperogi
War against Nigeria’s academic title fraud, By Farooq Kperogi
War against Nigeria’s academic title fraud, By Farooq Kperogi
Kperogi is a renowned columnist and United States-based Professor of Journalism.
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Opinion
Atiku, Obi, Kwankwaso are Tinubu’s most reliable campaigners, By Farooq Kperogi
Atiku, Obi, Kwankwaso are Tinubu’s most reliable campaigners, By Farooq Kperogi
Atiku, Obi, Kwankwaso are Tinubu’s most reliable campaigners, By Farooq Kperogi
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